اخبار محلية What is the shape and logic of the new phase of the conflict with the Saudi coalition?

اليكم الان What is the shape and logic of the new phase of the conflict with the Saudi coalition? والان إلى التفاصيل من المصدر الخبر اليمني:

With the Armed Forces’ announcement of the end of the “de-escalation” phase, following the Saudi assault on Sana’a International Airport, the detailed features of the new phase initiated by the call of Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi to “end the aggression, siege, and occupation” have begun to unfold officially. Starting from the fundamentals and logic of the national stance, to the equations, operational measures, and the form of diplomatic performance, this gives us a clearer picture of the transformation taking place in the course of the conflict with the Saudi coalition and what can be expected in the coming phase.Dherar Al-Tayyeb – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni: “Siege with Siege”… Returning to the Root of the Problem:Undoubtedly, the Armed Forces’ announcement of operating flights between Sana’a and Tehran airports was the first clear feature of the new phase called for by the Yemeni leadership. This step made it clear that Sana’a has moved beyond the box of merely “pressuring” Saudi Arabia to end the suffering of Yemenis and has begun to move towards imposing solutions through possible and legitimate means, and protecting them with tools of force and deterrence. This was clearly heralded by the call at the beginning of the Hijri year for popular and official movement to “end the aggression, siege, and occupation” and restore wealth, which was different from the usual logic of sending warnings and advice to Saudi Arabia.However, the launch of the new path needed an official announcement of the end of the old phase for the picture to become more comprehensive and clear, and for performance to become more integrated. Ironically, Saudi Arabia itself took care of this when it bombed Sana’a International Airport to prevent the landing of the second Iranian flight. In the new scene, the space for confrontation with Riyadh was no longer subject to probabilities but became a reality. The Yemeni Armed Forces had to respond by affirming the end of “de-escalation” after more than four years, to complete the effectiveness and image of breaking the air siege (as the first feature of the new phase). This was achieved by the process of bypassing Saudi restrictions imposed on Sana’a Airport coinciding with the process of imposing punitive deterrent measures on the Kingdom’s airports and airspace.Thus, the first equation of the new path crystallized, later called by Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi the equation of “siege with siege.” This description does not only focus on the part related to pressuring and punishing Saudi Arabia but also includes the subject of breaking restrictions and imposing solutions. The Saudi siege here no longer means refusing to implement understandings on operating Sana’a Airport or Hudaydah ports, as was understood during the “de-escalation” phase. Rather, it means Saudi Arabia’s insistence on controlling the activity and status of Yemeni airports and ports. It means Saudi interference in the movement of Yemenis and what enters and leaves Yemen.This is a different approach to dealing with the issue of the siege than what was prevalent in the “de-escalation” phase. However, it is not new. It can be said that the new path, in its logic, constitutes a return to dealing with the root of the problem, represented by Saudi “guardianship” over Yemen, instead of dealing with the symptom resulting from it, represented by refusing to implement understandings and procrastination.We can clearly observe this approach in the impactful speech delivered by Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi days after targeting Abha Airport, in response to the bombing of Sana’a Airport. The speech focuses heavily on the categorical and revolutionary rejection of the idea of Saudi Arabia controlling the lives, choices, and relations of Yemenis. It even frankly affirms that the Kingdom’s problem with Yemen is their “freedom.” On this basis, the firm approach to dealing with the Saudi stance is determined through equations such as “siege with siege,” not only to pressure Riyadh to reduce its intransigence but also to establish the principles of parity and justice that dismantle all the tricks and propaganda that Saudi Arabia relies on in its insistence on keeping Yemenis in a state of waiting for their rights.The “siege with siege” equation, which inaugurates the launch of the new path to resolve the conflict with Saudi Arabia, does not aim to force Riyadh to accept opening new destinations for Sana’a Airport or increasing its flight numbers. Rather, it aims to force it to stop trying to interfere in the airport’s activity altogether.The difference between the two states became clearer in the response of the Sana’a negotiating delegation to Jordan’s announcement of an “initiative” to operate flights between Sana’a and Amman using Jordanian aircraft. The delegation affirmed that operating any flights to and from Sana’a Airport is welcome within the framework of coordination with the competent authorities in Sana’a “without restrictions or conditions,” considering that the Jordanian announcement is nothing but an attempt to bypass the Yemenis’ demand to lift the siege on the airport, “within an agreement that ends guardianship over Yemen” and includes the rest of the other files such as salaries. Here we see a clear Saudi attempt to deal according to the considerations of the “de-escalation” phase, which allowed room to contain Sana’a’s discontent with formal steps to manage the crisis, thereby reinforcing Saudi Arabia’s retention of Yemenis’ rights as bargaining chips used when needed. In contrast, we see a new position established by Sana’a, based on the principle that operating Sana’a Airport is not a political problem that needs to be “resolved” diplomatically in isolation, but an absolute right of Yemenis guaranteed by their freedom and sovereignty, around which the conflict revolves.In other words: The de-escalation that Saudi Arabia is trying to return to through some formal steps is no longer available except through completely ending interference in Yemeni affairs. This means that the “siege with siege” equation cannot be frozen or disabled even through the complete lifting of air restrictions on Sana’a Airport, because the siege is a broader problem intertwined with many aspects of the “guardianship” that Saudi Arabia wants to impose on Yemen. New Field Data:Regarding the operational aspect of the “siege with siege” equation, Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi emphasized that targeting Abha Airport was a “modest” response and that the original should be Riyadh Airport in exchange for Sana’a Airport, and ports in exchange for ports.This announcement reinforces the Yemeni Armed Forces’ warning to airlines against crossing Saudi airspace following the bombing of Sana’a Airport, and their confirmation of the “seriousness” of this warning. It is clear that the next step – if the Saudi position does not change as required – will be the implementation of an air ban on Saudi Arabia, whether by targeting the main airports themselves or by penalizing violating airlines. The “modest” attack on Abha Airport provided a model for the extent of Sana’a’s ability to implement such a ban, as the airport’s operations were halted for several days, affecting Najran, Jizan, and Sharurah airports, with disruption reaching the skies of Riyadh and Jeddah.The Yemeni Armed Forces have previously targeted Saudi airports, but implementing a stringent ban on aviation activity in the Kingdom’s airspace would be an unprecedented development and would unequivocally affirm that there is no return to partial understandings regarding Sana’a Airport, as such a ban cannot be linked to demands with a lower ceiling than completely ending the air siege on Yemen.As it has become clear that the “siege with siege” equation is not limited to the Sana’a Airport file or air restrictions, Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly face a punitive Yemeni ban on its ports in the coming phase. This is in response to the restrictions it imposes on the arrival of goods to Hudaydah ports, which Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi emphasized, including noting that they contribute to raising the cost of some imported goods by 400%.Just as Sana’a did not limit itself to pressuring Saudi Arabia to break the air siege, it may also take a bold step regarding the naval blockade by bypassing the restrictions of the so-called “inspection mechanism” arbitrarily imposed by the Saudi coalition and the United States on imports to Hudaydah ports. This would have wide resonance for several considerations. The response to any Saudi attempt to hold on to these naval restrictions would not be limited to targeting Saudi ports themselves (a critical matter, especially for Yanbu port, which is the only remaining gateway for Saudi oil exports) but may also include imposing counter-restrictions on Saudi maritime navigation itself, which the world is anxiously anticipating. Any disruption in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea coinciding with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be a knockout blow to energy and shipping markets.Of course, if Saudi Arabia decides to respond to Sana’a’s moves to break the air and naval siege with a new military or economic escalation, this could push Sana’a to move to another key equation mentioned by Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi: the equation of “comprehensive escalation with comprehensive escalation,” which he clearly indicated would include striking all Saudi oil facilities.Although Sana’a has not officially defined the ceiling of “comprehensive escalation,” estimating this ceiling is not difficult. For example, the option of igniting fronts inside Yemen, an option that Saudi Arabia appears to heavily rely on, constitutes a comprehensive escalation, as does the option of launching a new bombardment campaign against Yemen, whether by Saudi Arabia alone or in conjunction with other parties.Saudi Arabia may gradually slide into the box of comprehensive escalation as it tries to hold on to the air and naval siege and exert field “pressures” on Sana’a. Diplomacy of the New Phase:In conclusion, it can be said that Sana’a has moved to a phase of continuous and comprehensive work to achieve the goal of ending the siege, occupation, and aggression, which means resolving the conflict with the Saudi coalition.While the logic of this phase is based on a clear and established principle of the necessity of liberation from guardianship and ensuring a decent life for Yemenis, and it is clear that the available and legitimate tools are capable of imposing and consolidating this logic on the ground, garnering wide popular support, some questions that many may prefer not to ask at length cannot be ignored. These relate to dealing with the Saudi bet on procrastination and tactical negotiation.The response of the national negotiating delegation to the Saudi-Jordanian “initiative” regarding the resumption of flights between Amman and Sana’a reflected a clear diplomatic alignment with the new position and an affirmation of the transition from partial understandings to decisive final solutions. However, the “de-escalation” experience (although largely governed by circumstances beyond the Yemeni negotiator’s control) created a complete lack of trust among the masses regarding the possibility of reaching any real and swift peaceful solutions with Saudi Arabia. This is something the political side in Sana’a should handle properly, especially given the high ceiling of the position, where the leadership’s discourse has integrated with popular interaction.This lack of trust has not reached the point of a categorical rejection of any negotiation with Saudi Arabia. However, it centers on a conviction – based on ample and strong evidence – that Riyadh uses negotiation cunningly as an escape route to avoid responsibility. There is a need for mechanisms that reduce its room for maneuver to the maximum extent possible, such as appropriately timing any understandings without “excessive” granting of time, detailing any agreements in a way that leaves no room for differing interpretations, requesting binding guarantees, in addition to not stopping all means of field pressure during negotiations, or responding immediately to any procrastination or backtracking.The diplomatic process still needs a clear launch that confirms that the negotiation mechanism with Saudi Arabia has been developed to suit the new phase and its objectives. This launch can be built on the strong declared position regarding the Saudi-Jordanian “initiative.”

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