اخبار محلية The Psychology of the Saudi Aggression and the Psychological Aspects in the Decision of the Losing Escalation Against Yemen

اليكم الان The Psychology of the Saudi Aggression and the Psychological Aspects in the Decision of the Losing Escalation Against Yemen والان إلى التفاصيل من المصدر الخبر اليمني:

Zakaria Al-Sharabi |Twelve years ago, the decision of the Saudi aggression on Yemen was launched from the assumption of the ease and speed of a decisive victory through air superiority in exchange for Yemeni internal fragmentation, the presence of mercenary parties in Yemen, and a wide process of recruitment for fighting in favor of Saudi Arabia, along with the state of weakness that the Yemeni state was suffering from in the military field. However, this war soon turned into a predicament for Riyadh that it should have reconsidered its calculations about and balanced between cost and return, as it is no longer only a war of attrition for its forces inside Yemen, but has come to touch the nerve of economic existence represented in oil and security stability.Although Saudi Arabia obtained an opportunity to de-escalate that began in the year 2022 and extended until 2026, it did not seize this opportunity, even though it came at the time following the Yemeni Armed Forces’ proof of their field steadfastness in exchange for what is known as the inevitable decline of the offensive on the part of Saudi Arabia and its allies. This is a state that resulted from the defender’s adaptation and the building of military strategies and capabilities that brought down the elements of offensive superiority and targeted its centers of gravity, reaching a state of launching a counterattack on it on a number of important fronts and returning the attackers to point zero, as happened in the Kitaf-Al-Buqa and Al-Malahit axis, as well as the fronts of Nihm, Marib, Al-Jawf, and Al-Bayda.Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia returned to escalation again, as it bombed Sana’a Airport to prevent an attempt to break the siege it imposes on Yemen, and also targeted areas with a number of airstrikes in Hudaydah Governorate, in conjunction with its preparation of military forces for ground offensive operations, and before that, the tightening of the siege on Yemen.Logically, the Saudi behavior cannot be explained by the calculation of cost and return, for during two years since the Al-Aqsa Flood, Yemen proved extraordinary military capabilities in terms of range and effectiveness, and in the face of major powers, it faced 5 American aircraft carriers and expelled them from the sea, and the American aggression ended in failure in two rounds in the era of Trump and Biden, and the Americans themselves came out with perceptions affirming the failure of dealing militarily with Yemen, and even Yemen recorded surprises, among them the use of ballistic missiles to hit moving targets, and their superiority in tactics over the American fleets. The same matter is no different with the Zionist entity, where Yemen imposed a comprehensive ban on Israeli navigation and the port of Umm Al-Rashrash was disrupted, and intensive operations were carried out targeting the Zionist depth, and the Yemeni missiles bypassed the Hetz and THAAD systems.The Saudi regime should have taken this into consideration, for the fall of the American protection umbrella and Washington’s abandonment of its goal of protecting Israeli navigation in the Red Sea, as an acknowledgment of Yemen’s strength, would have delivered a message that Saudi Arabia will not be heavier in Washington’s calculations than the Zionism.Perception and Misunderstanding in International Politics:Perception represents a major element in shaping international politics and decision-making, and it is fundamental in war. Sun Tzu says: “If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither your enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”And decision-makers, when formulating perceptions, rely on a stock of historical events and personal experiences, in addition to institutional studies and intelligence information, which provides a mental map for their interpretation of events and their making of decisions regarding them. However, not every perception process may be built on realistic information and be free of cognitive and behavioral biases, which makes it important to focus on the perception of leaders and the psychological environment of the decision-maker, in contrast to theories that focus on the distribution of power in the international system or the general choices determined by the structure of this system.The cognitive biases that affect the decision-maker come from a number of psychological influences, especially when the decision is linked to a single person at the head of a dictatorial regime, as is the case in Saudi Arabia. Among these influences is what Robert Jervis mentioned in his book Perception and Misunderstanding in International Politics, which puts forward an important theoretical approach to the psychological factors on decision-making.1- Heuristic ReasoningHeuristic reasoning is defined as a mental shortcut used by individuals to simplify the decision-making process, where the mood or the immediate emotional response resulting from the stimulus is employed as a sufficient criterion for favoring a certain option, away from the detailed comparative analysis of the functional and material characteristics of the alternative.Based on this, the Saudi dealing with Yemen was based on a pre-existing mental image that an independent Yemen represents a threat to Saudi Arabia, which shaped Saudi policy over decades toward Yemen. To this was later added incorrect mental perceptions formed in Riyadh based on linking Yemeni movements to Iran, and therefore Saudi Arabia went to sign the Beijing Agreement with Iran, imagining that this agreement would solve its problem with Yemen.The Availability Heuristic:It is a mental shortcut or “cognitive background” in which the human mind relies on the speed and prevalence of recalling certain examples or information to issue judgments and assess the extent of the frequency or probability of the occurrence of a matter. When you are asked to assess a risk or make a decision, your mind does not search through all the realistic statistics; rather, it searches “the nearest drawer” in memory, and the things that reside in this drawer and appear quickly are usually the ones used.Recent developments have shown Saudi Arabia falling into this dilemma, as it sees the possibility of repeating what happened in Syria in Yemen. It is quoted from Mohammed bin Salman that he recently conveyed to Trump that Iran has lost its influence in Syria and Lebanon and only Iraq and Yemen remain, which reflects a pattern of generalization without the realistic characteristics of each party. Rather, it is a perception based on the idea that Iran has weakened after the American-Israeli aggression and that this will be reflected on Iran’s allies.The Anchoring Effect:It is a cognitive and psychological bias in which the human mind tends to over-rely on the first piece of information it receives (which is called the “anchor”) when making decisions or conducting estimates, even if that information is illogical or irrelevant to the subject.This effect stands out with regard to the Saudi decision in a number of aspects that led to the behavior of the recent escalation.The Saudi regime viewed that the problem of failure in Yemen lies in the fragmentation of the parties affiliated with it and in the presence of the UAE as an ally of it in the aggression on Yemen and its creation of military formations in the southern governorates and the districts of the western coast. Accordingly, it created new power structures such as the Dira Al-Watan forces and the Salafi emergency forces. It was building according to initial estimates that the UAE’s occupation of vast areas of Yemen was only because it relied on formations it created away from the official structures of the proxy government. Accordingly, it made pivotal changes that began first with the removal of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the appointment of Rashad Al-Alimi, then the expulsion of the UAE from the coalition, then the formation of a joint command that reached direct supervision over the fingerprints of the soldiers and their salaries. The victory of the Yemeni Armed Forces, in the Saudi view, was only because its opponents were fragmented, without a realistic study of the factors of the victories. The matter even reached the point of building on data that there is a state of fragmentation, collapse, and weakness, which are rumors circulated by media outlets as a kind of propaganda, but they turned into data for decision-making.This was one of the aspects. As for the other aspect, it was the Saudi estimates that Yemen, after the battle with the US of America and the Zionist entity during the support of Gaza, had become drained in its military capabilities, and accordingly Yemen has become weak and the decisive victory will be easy.Confirmatory Bias and Cognitive Dissonance:The factor of confirmatory bias combines with the factor of anchoring, as individuals favor information that reinforces their preconceived beliefs, and leaders and officials ignore evidence that contradicts their orientations, which consolidates their original positions. This is common in the behavior of the Saudi regime in general toward Yemen and the region, where there is selectivity in information. We have monitored during the heat of the confrontations testimonies affirming that Saudi Arabia was receiving information that the field situation of its affiliated forces was above good, and these were media reports, but the interpretations that will come later will show why this influence plays a major role.In contrast to confirmatory bias comes cognitive dissonance. After realizing the error of the reports and information that were previously relied upon, the decision-maker tends to reject the facts and search for other interpretations, which appeared after the liberation of the western coast districts, where the Saudi media began to explain the reasons for the collapse as betrayals.The Sunk Cost Fallacy:This concept emerged during the Vietnam War and is based on generating irrational commitments toward continuing the course based on previous investments, where the US sought to continue the conflict despite the succession of evidence of the impossibility of victory. The combination of psychological factors with the wrong interpretations of the Vietnamese intentions and capabilities resulted in a protracted war with destructive consequences.The same matter applies to Saudi Arabia, which sees that it has lost a lot in Yemen and should complete the investment in the war to reap the results, while betting that prolonging the time could lead to an internal collapse in Yemen.Cultural Disparities:The decision-maker in Riyadh assumed that military pressure and economic siege would impose on Sana’a the same calculations adopted by traditional governments, ignoring that the fighting doctrine and the political environment operate according to criteria different from pain, cost, and the ability to endure.Hubris Syndrome:The term hubris may be viewed as a metaphorical expression of behavior that usually tends toward injustice and the rejection of facts, but in psychology it is a pathological syndrome, consisting of a group of traits (“symptoms”) triggered by a specific stimulus (power), and usually recedes with the decline of that power. This syndrome is classified as an acquired condition, which distinguishes it from most personality disorders that persist throughout adulthood. Dictatorships are particularly prone to hubris due to the absence or rarity of restrictions imposed on their behavior.Hubris syndrome has been formulated as a behavioral pattern in a person who possesses the following characteristics:1. Sees the world as an arena for self-glorification through the exercise of power.2. Tends to take actions whose primary goal is to improve his personal image.3. Gives disproportionate attention to image and public appearance.4. Speaks with messianic fervor and excessive self-glorification.5. Confuses himself with the nation or the institution.6. Uses the royal plural “we” in his speech.7. Shows excessive self-confidence.8. Shows outright contempt for others.9. Sees himself as accountable before a higher court exclusively (history or God).10. Firmly believes in his innocence and the correctness of his position before that court.11. Loses contact with reality.12. Tends toward anxiety, recklessness, and impulsive decisions.13. Makes alleged moral uprightness a justification for ignoring the practical aspects, cost, and results.14. Shows incompetence accompanied by neglect of the precise details of policymaking.Applying these characteristics to the behavior of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in the context of the first three traits, Bin Salman worked on presenting the war on Yemen as a messianic battle that ends the previous policy and inaugurates a new phase of decisiveness and determination, while relying on the assumption of deciding the battle within a few weeks.He also presented the political and development projects in return as a path to transfer the state from backwardness to modernity, such as marketing “Vision 2030,” the “NEOM” project, and the “The Line” city with promises exceeding the technical and financial reality (building a vertical city with a giant mirror extending for hundreds of kilometers in the middle of the desert).In his famous interview with Thomas Friedman (New York Times, 2017) and with “Bloomberg” network, he described his moves as “the restoration of moderate Islam” and a race against time that he leads alone, while showing absolute conviction in his ability to change the entire balances of the Middle East.The fourth, fifth, and sixth traits appear in the intensive promotional campaigns in the capitals of the West in 2018, and the huge spending on international public relations companies to highlight him personally as a “young historic reformer” who broke the restrictions of the religious institution, accompanied by the purchase of the yacht “Serene,” the Palace of Louis XIV, and the painting “The Savior of the World” for hundreds of millions to consecrate the image of wealth and cosmic influence.It is also no secret that he created electronic armies whose entire work is based on glorifying him and presenting him as a loyal leader, and also his presentation of a speech from the office of his uncle, King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, in an attempt to evoke the narrated history of his uncle in the seventies of the last century, even though the image drawn of Faisal as a nationalist leader is inaccurate and contradicts his role in entrenching American hegemony over the region.He also went beyond the Saudi historical model based on consensus between the wings of the Al Saud and the distribution of sovereign ministries, to carrying out a coup against his cousin Mohammed bin Nayef and then installing himself as prime minister, and monopolizing all authorities in his hand. Alongside that, he detained dozens of princes, major businessmen, and former ministers and stripped them of their assets outside the framework of the judiciary; which matches the fifth criterion of hubris syndrome, where the leader sees his personal vision as the exclusive criterion for integrity and the interest of the state.In the same context, we also find the talking in official speeches and press interviews in the name of the state and society in a categorical and absolute form, such as: “We don’t waste our time.. We are changing the Kingdom.. The Middle East will be the new Europe thanks to what we are doing.”He went as far as excluding and marginalizing the traditional military and diplomatic leaders in Riyadh who warned of the danger of direct involvement in Yemen and the nature of its difficult geography, which is represented by the seventh trait, and also applies to his violation of all the advice given to him regarding his policies in the region and even his internal policies.The eighth trait of hubris syndrome assumes an exaggerated self-belief that approaches a sense of omnipotence in achievement, and that is what we saw and heard when he said that he can uproot those he describes as the Houthis in a few days and will reach Sana’a, as well as the absolute certainty of the possibility of building a trillion-dollar city like “NEOM” and housing millions in it according to record timelines that defy the geological and financial reality.Bin Salman considers himself accountable only before history, and that the goal is limited to building the future away from radical visions and propositions. At the same time, he is largely out of contact with reality, especially with regard to the aggression on Yemen, and relies on a closed and very short advisory circle, and this circle portrayed to him for years the near end of the war in Yemen and the disintegration of the Yemeni force resisting the aggression.The trait of anxiety, recklessness, and impulsiveness appears clearly in his actions and even his appearance, and there are examples of his handling of a number of problems such as his detention of the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2017, his imposition of the blockade on Qatar, and the execution of Khashoggi. The trait of relying on the “broad vision” of moral right to bypass scrutiny of realism, cost, and results also appears in his handling of Yemen, where he continues to fund the aggression with billions of dollars monthly for years despite the field losses, under an unrealistic pretext, which is protecting the security of the Kingdom.All the previous traits herald incompetence and appearing in the guise of the floundering without conceding to obtain a rational and clear strategy.Third: The Functional State:Saudi Arabia is known for being a functional state, and in the context of the aggression on Yemen, the American role emerged as a major role in the preparation, planning, and participation, and it also emerged in obstructing reaching a settlement. Bin Salman tried to present himself as a representative of Western interests in the region, so he presented himself as concerned with implementing Resolution 2216, even though the resolution doesn’t grant him the right to aggress against Yemen. He also presents himself as the protector of international navigation and that he is doing so on behalf of the world.Returning to American policy, we find that Washington has taken a path based on its proxies bearing their responsibilities while it plays a supervisory role from behind. In pursuit of that, the intelligence agencies and national security advisers pump selective intelligence reports and information that inflame the fears of the Saudi leadership, feed its feelings of existential threat, and make it imagine its ability to achieve a rapid decisive victory. This is a manipulation that deliberately brought the regional decision-maker into the trap of “confirmatory bias” and “cognitive anchoring,” to entangle him in an attritional confrontation that serves in the final analysis arms sales and the consolidation of military and political dependence on the West.The characterization of Bin Salman by the desire for personal glory, the monopolization of opinion, and the weakness of field military experience has also represented an entry point for the US to push him forward, as he was described by Trump as a “historic reformer and a decisive regional leader,” which led to inflating his self-confidence and preventing him from the mechanisms of self-criticism.Washington and Tel Aviv also deliberately framed the changes in Yemen within the mind of the Saudi decision-maker as an “absolute strategic loss that brings down Saudi prestige,” to deliberately push the leader into the zone of “gambling and seeking high risk” (Risk-Seeking) instead of absorbing and containing the variables politically, to ensure the continuation of the war as a tool of permanent attrition of the region’s capabilities and economies.Risk Theory:The determinants of the “Prospect and Risk Theory” of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky complement each other in explaining the military and strategic behavior of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the aggression on Yemen, through deconstructing the cognitive structure of the profit and loss calculations and their impact on the decision-making mechanism under the weight of uncertainty. Saudi Arabia created a reference point represented in the political situation of the country as a backyard subject to Riyadh’s hegemony, and with the September 21 revolution and the bringing down of the guardianship, this shift was, according to the Saudi framework, a sharp drop from that reference point; and an “absolute strategic loss” that strips the Kingdom of its historical influence over Yemen.This perception represented one of the motives of the Saudi aggression on Yemen. When the Saudi ambassador in London was asked when the bombing on Yemen would stop, his response was that this is like asking when you will stop beating your wife.With the faltering of the military decisive victory and the transformation of the conflict into a protracted predicament for the Saudi regime, the mechanism of “non-adaptation to losses” coupled with the “sunk cost fallacy” manifested; the leader who hasn’t reconciled with his losses refuses to adjust his reference point to match the new data, and remains clinging to his previous position before the crisis. This cognitive incapacity was reflected in the continuation of the escalation of operations, the doubling of armament spending, and the gambling by exposing the vital depth and oil facilities to drone and ballistic missile strikes, in the hope of a sudden variable occurring that saves the original bet, or at least prevents the increase of losses, as Saudi Arabia refuses to see any strength or sovereignty for Yemen.

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